Durant Report 1953

You don’t have to dig that deep into the half-glimpsed phenomenon of UFOs to reveal the involvement of specific U.S. intelligence agencies operating behind the scenes.

Perhaps the most notable scene-setting, hands-on pressure dates back to January 1953 with a group of esteemed researchers and scientists that came to be known collectively as the Robertson Panel - named after the Chairman of the Panel, physicist and CIA consultant, Dr Howard Percy Robertson. This small CIA-sponsored team (which counted such phenomenon luminaries as Professor J. Allen Hynek and Captain Edward J. Ruppelt in an advisory capacity) was tasked with ruminating over a modest selection of UFO incidents (around 20) and, eventually, collating their conclusions and recommendations. This work - and the recommendations made - have become known as the "Durant Report" (after panel secretary, CIA Officer F. C. Durant).

The "Durant Report" set out the following purpose:

...to present
a. A brief history of the meetings of the O/SI Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects (Part I),
b. An unofficial supplement to the official Panel Report to AD/SI setting forth comments and suggestions of the Panel Members which they believed were inappropriate for inclusion in the formal report (Part II).

If you are not familiar with the content of the Durant Report I suggest you download the brief summaries of the evidence-gathering meetings and the outcomes over at the hallowed halls of the Computer UFO Network. Even now, in 2014, it makes for sobering reading.

One of the most notable points is that this document provides us with the first tangible example of a politically-motivated, debunking ethos. Not only that, but a debunking and controlling ethos that was being signed off as policy. There's absolutely no question that, if you're looking for the first generous scattering of the debunking seed, you will find the Durant Report a valuable place to start.

The prevailing theme of the document and, by extension, the Robertson Panel itself is that it is not the phenomenon itself that perplexes but the public reaction to it. The report pivots on a particularly narrow point of view; that the effect of "flying saucers" on public consciousness is a problem and, furthermore, is a potential vulnerability that could be exploited (by the Soviet Union). Members of the Robertson Panel summed up such threats as follows:

...although evidence of any direct threat from these sightings was wholly lacking, related dangers might well exist resulting from:
a. Misidentification oœ actual enemy artifacts by defense personnel.
b. Overloading of emergency reporting channels with "false" information ("noise to signal ratio" analogy -- Berkner).
c. Subjectivity of public to mass hysteria and greater vulnerability to possible enemy psychological warfare.
Although not the concern of CIA, the first two of these problems may seriously affect the Air Defense intelligence system, and should be studied by experts, possibly under ADC. If U.F.O.'s become discredited in a reaction to the "flying saucer" scare, or if reporting channels are saturated with false and poorly documented reports, our capability of detecting hostile activity will be reduced.

Notice in the above that the first two areas were written up as "not the concern of the CIA" thus we can deduce that number 3, with its psychological edge, clearly was the domain of the CIA. Given what was to come in the contactee and MK-Ultra times ahead, this is a somewhat portentous remark.

The Robertson Panel also highlighted much of the general dubunking stylistics such as you will find in other loaded official studies (Condon Report for example). First, the cases to be studied are cherry-picked and, second, the panel itself is comprised of minds that, for one reason or another, are already made up. Consequently few, if any, of the formal panel were capable of neutrality and the cynic might say that this was by design and not accident. This approach, which you will no-doubt be familiar with, is summed up by Michael Swords and Robert Powell in "UFOs and Government":

Robertson viewed supporters of the mysteriousness of UFOs in derisive terms. He called them “Forteans,” as if they were disciples of the early 20th century collector of anomalies, Charles Fort... Robertson assessed such behavour as irrational and impractical, and lumped Fort and UFO study encouragers into one pile. With four scientists ignorant of the phenomenon and one extremely biased panel administrator, the panel, in January, was complete.

As if further evidence of this disregard for proper consideration were required one of the key Panel members, physicist Lloyd Berkner, missed the entire first two and a half days. However, he did manage to add his signature to the Panel findings in spite of this... As J. Allen Hynek later reflected on his time on the Robertson Panel in the documentary "UFOs Past, Present and Future":

"...when the report finally came out, that is, the recommendations, I was not overly surprised to find the tack they had taken of the general need for debunking."

The fledgling CIA had clearly been playing close attention to the USAF handling of the UFO issue throughout the beginnings of Project Blue Book. One might argue that, from their perspective, the perceived national security and communications issues were requiring greater management and/or circumspection. Such concerns were actually made clear in a 1952 memorandum written by Assistant Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (O/SI) H Marshall Chadwell to Director of the CIA Walter Bedell Smith in September 1952. In this eye-opening top-level memo Chadwell poses the following issues to be addressed:

a) Whether there are national security implications in the problem of unidentified flying objects ie. flying saucers
b) Whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and
c) What further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.

It is pretty clear from this memo that the CIA had specific concerns about the information on the phenomenon at their disposal and there can be little doubt that the events of July 1952 over Washington D.C. must have amplified these. Given this chain of interest the CIA sponsorship of the Robertson Panel may represent a first proper "loading of the dice." Was the Robertson Panel simply rubber-stamping methods and approaches already considered if not decided upon? In 1967, Robertson Panel member Thornton Page hinted:

"Robertson told us in the first private session that our job was to reduce public concern, and show that UFO reports could be explained by conventional reasoning."

Throughout the briefings a small number of case histories chosen were discussed and quickly discounted. Hynek later recalled:

"The viewing of the two films is the incident which remains by far the most vivid in my mind... There was a whole interplay of comments. Not exactly wisecracks , but "Well, it certainly looks like seagulls to me," and "You can't convince me that that's not birds, it's gotta be birds," and words to that effect."

One of the two movies (projected against a wall) during the Robertson Panel. Shot on 16mm film by Warrant Officer Delbert Newhouse, several miles north of Tremonton, Utah (1952)

But how exactly to influence and manage the "flying saucer" phenomenon in public? One of the most intriguing outcomes of the Durant Report was the recommendation in favour of a program of education and debunking. The training would consider a range of more training course to condition the American public and thus limit the "excitement" around flying saucers:

The Panel's concept of a broad educational program integrating efforts of all concerned agencies was that it should have two major aims: training and "debunking." The training aim would result in proper recognition of unusually illuminated objects (e.g., balloons, aircraft reflections) as well as natural phenomena (meteors, fireballs, mirages, noctilucent clouds). Both visual and radar recognition are concerned. There would be many levels in such education from enlisted personnel to command and research personnel. Relative emphasis and degree of explanation of different programs would correspond to the categories of duty (e.g., radar operators; pilots; control tower operators; Ground Observer Corps personnel; and officers and enlisted men in other categories). This training should result in a marked reduction in reports caused by misidentification and resultant confusion.

The "debunking" aim would result in reduction in public interest in "flying saucers" which today evokes a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accomplished by mass media such as television, motion pictures, and popular articles. Basis of such education would be actual case histories which had been puzzling at first but later explained. As in the case of conjuring tricks, there is much less stimulation if the "secret" is known. Such a program should tend to reduce the current gullibility of the public and consequently their susceptibility to clever hostile propaganda. The Panel noted that the general absence of Russian propaganda based on a subject with so many obvious possibilities for exploitation might indicate a possible Russian official policy.

The second film shown during the Robertson Panel. Filmed on 16mm by Nick Mariana in Great Falls, Montana (1950)

Alongside this, the Durant Report pointed the finger of suspicion at civilian UFO groups such as APRO, outlining a requirement to keep tabs on their activity and acknowledging their potential - in the eyes of the state anyway - for sedition. This may seem totally incredible but bear in mind that by 1953 Cold War paranoia was already slipping into top gear:

The Panel took cognizance of the existence of such groups as the "Civilian Flying Saucer Investigators" (Los Angeles) and the "Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (Wisconsin). It was believed that such organizations should be watched because of their potentially great influence on mass thinking if widespread sightings should occur. The apparent irresponsibility and the possible use of such groups for subversive purposes should be kept in mind.

Ultimately, the discussion and outcomes of the Durant Report set in motion both the need for and type of “noise” that arguably still clouds reasonable debate on this whole subject area even now. Think that the UFO debate is some wide-open, level playing field of raw potential? Think again. When the details of the Durant Report were finally known in full, the guiding hand of the CIA in stage management was abundantly clear. Like it or not, that’s one in the eye for those who claim that information on this subject flows freely. Err, no. Not only is information covered up, the American public at least have been "educated" to doubt their own senses and to leave any lingering sense of curiosity outside.

Almost inevitably when I have a discussion with people on the UFO subject the whole “cover up” thing rears its head. While this is a great shame that the phenomenon should always be weighed up between these markers in day to day conversation, one question has to be why such markers exist in the first place? Could it be that the Durant Panel blueprint has been more pervasive than we might at first think?

a. That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Unidentified Flying Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired;
b. That the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training, and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action.
We suggest that these aims may be achieved by an integrated program designed to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence of inimical forces behind the phenomenon, to train personnel to recognize and reject false indications quickly and effectively, and to strengthen regular channels for the evaluation of and prompt reaction to true indications of hostile measures.

Personally, I consider the priorities, approaches and methods of the Durant Report to be an “education program” in itself. And while it is very much a product of its time, you have to raise an eyebrow or two over just how far people will go to disengage and ensure that others do too.

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